Role: FO (gate return) (never took off)We pushed back from Gate XX at ZZZ. We receive the EFIS (Electronic Flight Instrument System) COMP MON (normal). Once we began taxiing we noticed two red MAGs (Magnetic Heading) on both PFDs (Primary Flight Display) at the top of the ramp. We decide to taxi to see if it clears. It does not. It persists. Eventually, after taxing for some time (due to ZZZ congestion), FO side goes normal Captain side still has the RED MAG with the TO red line through and RED FD (Flight Director) box. Eventually FO side mirrors it. After running checklists to figure out the problem no luck since it was a dual mag failure there was no way in resorting to a ""nonfaulty"" side. After talking with Maintenance and the Chief Pilot it went to a EFIS COMP MON. We were not comfortable taking an aircraft into night IMC with a suspension of faulty magnetometers, After the gate return (Gate XY) same thing occurs on the new aircraft out of Gate XZ. And I mean same thing nearing 45 mins on the taxiway and doing some circles on the field to see if the problem clears. We return back to XZ where the flight was than cancelled.What was concerning was the way BOTH of us had a mag failure not just one side. Especially with the failures persisting for 30 plus mins. Though I am still fairly new never had a dual RED MAG failure even at ZZZ.The Captain's narrative (below) has more detail since he was in communications with Maintenance Control and both Chief Pilots while I was monitoring Tower/Ground and our cabin.""I was Captain for Aircraft X ZZZ- ZZZZ on Day 0. In two successive aircraft, I pushed back from the gate and experience a dual AHRS failure. Red FD (Flight Director) and Red MAG (Magnetic Heading) flags appeared, the Flight Director disappeared, and there was a red line through the TO/TO annunciation on the FMA (Flight Mode Annunciator). In both instances I referred to the QRH Non-EICAS AHRS Failure checklist, but that directs the crew to switch to the reliable AHRS and does not refer to a dual AHRS failure. I know ZZZ has 'known magnetic anomalies' so in both instances I did taxi towards the runway in hopes that they would clear. This did not work. I also tried flipping the heading from MAG to DG (Directional Gyro) and back again (as is done with EFIS COMP MON). This would result in the situation either not changing, or briefly changing, and then reverting to the AHRS failure. In both instances I consulted Maintenance, who advised me they had ' codes ' for AHRS failures from the MDC (Maintenance Diagnostic Computer) . In both instances I checked for popped circuit breakers. I did not have any.I considered that even if I were to have the messages clear for a minute and then take off, if I had a dual AHRS failure in route, I would have no yaw damper, no Flight Director, and no autopilot. Winds were very strong in ZZZ, so my choices would probably have been to conduct a visual approach to XX in low level wind shear with no yaw damper, using the ISI (Integrated Standby Instrument), or to continue to ZZZZ, where I would have better wind conditions, but an approaching snow storm with light gusts, and then make a significant maintenance write up in a foreign country.I did consult with Maintenance and the Chief Pilot both times, they weren't able to advise me why I was have repeating failures on both AHRS, and left the decision to fly or gate return to me. I decided to gate return as this guaranteed the safe outcome of the flight, and while I believe I could be successful in that windshear/no yaw damper/ visual approach situation, that would be accepting a substantially elevated amount of risk. ""If your family was on board, would you like to take off and hope the AHRS keeps working ? It hasn't for more than a few minutes in the last hour and neither I nor the company maintenance experts know why. If it doesn't, the safety measures on the jet will be significantly degraded, and the weather is quite challenging. 'As Imentioned before I am very aware of the known magnetic anomalies in ZZZ and frequently deal with them via the EFIS COMP MON procedure, as that is our typical practice and EFIS COMP MON caution is how they present. I have never seen a dual AHRS failure before here, and the aircraft's EICAS explicitly tells the crew not to take off with that failure. Sorry for the trouble. I do not know why this would happen in two aircraft in a row; I'm not sure if there is a ground equipment or electrical power issue that is interfering with the aircraft's magnetometers, or even possibly something the aircraft was transporting. I did taxi around substantially, so if damage was caused by ferrous metal outside the aircraft, it remained during more than an hour of taxiing and trouble shooting. Again sorry for the trouble and the loss of revenue, that being said the aircraft seemed to be malfunctioning and it was not clear why so I stand by my decision."" I also stand by my decision in the agreement of returning back to the gate with the suspicion of a dual magnetometer failure both times.Cause: Magnetic anomalies at ZZZ part of it? Most likely. But to cause a dual mag failure?? Not sure yet.

Approach turned Aircraft X in too close behind Aircraft Y (I think it was Aircraft Y) and before they lost wake turbulence separation they were able to get pilot visual separation. While this did fix that issue, there was no way I was going to have runway separation. I offered Aircraft X S turns to the left only for spacing and Aircraft X accepted and performed the S turns. The S turn was enough to get runway separation. However, as Aircraft X was touching down his mains, Aircraft X experienced a wake turbulence encounter and elected to go around. I gave him instructions and shipped him to Departure to be re-sequenced for another approach. My Supervisor said I was not allowed to offer S turns. I replied of course I can offer S turns, where does it say I can't? All this was taking place in the Tower cab causing a distraction as not only myself but other controllers started questioning where this Supervisor came up with this 'rule.'The Supervisor continued looking on a computer in the Tower cab trying to find the 'rule.' But he could not. So he used Google AI and he said Google AI said I can't. I didn't respond to such a ridiculous and Tower cab distracting statement. Other controllers challenged that our rules don't come from Google AI which is obvious. This topic continued on for about 45 minutes as a distraction. Later he called me into his office and told me we were having an expectations discussion, later I heard an OM say it was a performance discussion. But during whatever type of discussion it was, it concluded with him unable to find any rule that says I can't offer an S turn. He found a safety bulletin that said we should avoid issuing instructions that can cause an unstable approach. One - a safety bulletin is advisory and not regulatory. And two - I do follow the safety bulletin and avoid causing an unstable approach, in this case it was the only way to get runway separation and was unavoidable. Additionally, if I didn't offer the S turn, Aircraft X would have been much closer and the wake turbulence encounter would have been worse, so what I did was actually safer. The pilot did not go around due to an unstable approach, but due to a wake turbulence encounter. Totally separate things. The Supervisor then told me he didn't want any more potentially significant events to happen under his watch and that I am instructed to never solicit or instruct an aircraft to do anything that might cause an unstable approach. To include S turns, reduce to final inside the marker or reduce to slowest practical speed inside the marker. No one else at the facility has been instructed to not do these things, only me. To my knowledge, no one has talked with Approach to prevent future wake turbulence encounters from happening, only this unwarranted focus on unstable approaches which had nothing to do with this event.Recommendations: Preventing this wake turbulence encounter from happening again means talking to Approach to come up with solutions such as providing better spacing on final. Approach needs to be made aware of this event.I was singled out unfairly. This is unacceptable and must be corrected immediately.It should be explained to the Supervisor that my soliciting of an unstable approach had nothing to do with the go-around. It was a wake turbulence encounter. The S turn actually reduced the effect of the encounter as more time and distance was gained by the maneuver, it actually made it safer not less safe. All talk of unstable approaches is irrelevant to this occurrence.It should be explained to the Supervisor that discussions about rules and procedures are not to done in the Tower cab. It's a distraction to the operation. Especially when every controller completely disagrees with the Supervisor's made up or interpreted rule. These discussions should be made outside of the operations area.It should be explained to the Supervisor that Google AI and other such sources are not approved for working air traffic. To quotesuch a site is ridiculous. If Management wants to make up new rules or procedures, it should be through the SOP. Where the union and Management collaborate and then every controller follows the same rules. Not this set of rules for this Supervisor or this set of rules for this controller.I understand pressure on supervisors is causing them to do things just to save their pay raises or their jobs. This is a failure of upper management. Any Supervisor that focuses on the safety and efficiency of the operation and the controllers that work for them should be excelling. Instead they are worried about things that are not nearly are significant as the desk people say they are. I've worked in Tower cabs for years, I know when it's significant or not in the real sense.

On today's flight from ZZZ to ASE, we experienced a possible approach deviation during the final stages of the flight. For this flight SIC was acting as the PF and PIC was the PNF. This flight presented several challenges as it was conducted in a high-terrain, high-elevation environment in a very short distance. In addition adverse weather conditions with strong winds, intermittent snow showers, icing, and turbulence increased the pilot workload. Before departure, we were advised about a 4-hour EDEC (Expect Departure Clearance Time) delay at ZZZ due to weather at the destination.PF contacted ZZZ ATC via phone and asked them to communicate to ATC that upon our arrival at ASE, we are able to conduct the special approach, the LOC DME 15, with a circle to land on runway 33, which we were qualified approved to conduct. Based on these info about our capabilities our EDEC was voided and we were given permission to depart on time. During the descent phase, while the PF was listening for ATIS updates, I (as the PNF) contacted Aspen Approach as instructed by Denver Center. The controller asked if we could accept an approach with a high tailwind conditions exceeding the limits for a straight-in landing. As planned and briefed, I requested the LOC DME 15 approach and requested approach to relay to ASE tower our intention to circle to land for runway 33.Shortly after, we received vectors for sequence and descent instructions. These required rapid speed adjustments and aircraft configuration, which increased our workload, especially under the adverse weather conditions (IMC, Icing, turbulence)Which require deployment of the airbrakes (boards) to be deployed causing additional airspeed monitoring requirements and abnormal noise levels. As we approached the final course, it became clear that the vectors were taking us through the final approach course. The PF requested a direct course on the FMS while I was simultaneously communicating with approach receiving our approach clearance. Once we switched to tower frequency, I checked in, stating that we were on the LOC DME 15 approach with the intention to circle to land on runway 33. The tower acknowledged, but then moments later issued a low altitude alert. I clarified that we were conducting the LOC DME 15 and not the LOC DME E. Tower came back stating that we were cleared for the LOC DME E thus the low altitude alert.After confirming we had visual contact with the runway, we proceeded with the circle-to-land maneuver and landed without further incident. Following the landing, the ground controller provided a phone number for a possible pilot deviation. The PF called the number and provided his license information. During the call PF was informed that the communication would be logged, and it was suggested that in future, we specify the 'special' approach to avoid confusion. Furthermore he mentioned that they have been many instances of miscommunication in the past regarding these two approaches due to the similarity in name.Please note. The flight segment involved a high workload, and I cannot confidently recall every ATC communication with certainty. While reflecting and evaluating potential scenarios, I don't want to dismiss the possibility of pilot communication errors. The possible threats that I can think of include miscommunication due to similar approach names. The approach in use was the LOC DME E for runway 15, while the special approach is the LOC DME 15. I would like to believe that if LOC DME E was assigned, we would have caught it, as we always request the LOC DME 15, even in VMC conditions, to maintain the required currency. Confirmation bias from pilots and/or ATC: Due to the similarity in names, the crew may have assumed the LOC DME approach referred to the special approach, while ATC was referring to the LOC DME E. A failure of CRM on the pilots' side. In high-workload ineffective Crew Resource Management (CRM), may have led to missed cues or incorrect interpretation of instructions, reducing the team's ability to manage the situation effectively. To prevent similar incidents in the future, we should enhance Crew Resource Management (CRM) with a focus on clear communication during high-workload situations. Prevent communication interference. As suggested by tower ensure approach requests are clearly specified by adding the word 'special'. Review standard operating procedures. Conduct thorough post-flight debriefings to improve communication and decision-making for future flights.

There is a recurring equipment issue at C90 with the frequency 125.0. We use 125.0 as our primary frequency on the midnight/overnight shifts.I receive regular pilot reports about static and feedback on the frequency in between transmissions while using 125.0, generally at altitudes below 8000 and north or east of ORD. During midnight operations at C90, all operations are on 125.0 as culturally it is unacceptable to have multiple flights on different frequencies. All transmissions/communications must occur on a shared frequency during overnight operations. 125.0 is the primary departure frequency during the daytime operations until more sectors begin to get opened. It's unacceptable to have such issues with any frequency, but especially one that is used primarily all day every day. The occasional reports of static between transmissions on 125.0 is very concerning as it indicates that there is an intermittent problem with equipment that is used to process the 125.0 frequency. I cannot even begin to imagine how catastrophic the consequences would be if 125.0 finally failed after months, possibly years, of neglect due to everyone's inability/unwillingness to address the problem, especially during a time of moderate traffic, single scope operations on a midnight shift. Each and every time we receive these reports, we change aircraft to other frequencies and the issues always disappear. We continually report this issue to Technical Operations using a frequency discrepancy report and it seems to go nowhere. After getting multiple reports of static in between transmissions from aircraft, primarily located in the vicinity of ORD between surface - 6500 feet, we turn in the report to Technical Operations. The frequency is occasionally taken out of service for 6 - 8 hours until the same singular Technical Operations employee arrives for their shift. In what appears to be an effort to get tickets closed the employee will ask Air Traffic to get 1 singular air check on the frequency. This is usually done with an aircraft well above the problem altitudes of the frequency, and the Technical Operations employee is given the 5 by 5 report and the frequency is quickly and promptly returned to service, only to start the process over the next day or next week. The problem has become so routine that most members of management won't even pass the report on to Technical Operations anymore citing, that's just the way it is.Today while working the sector Aircraft X reported a lot of feedback on the frequency while climbing out of 7000 eastbound off ORD. I defeatedly advised them that facility leadership has determined it is a non-issue and previous reports have been dismissed as the issue being fixed.The problem needs to be more thoroughly researched and troubleshot by Technical Operations to identify the root cause of the problem. The continual process of showing it out of service for a few hours just to return it back when the same usual employee shows up for their night shift in the Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC) in an effort to keep ticket times down is entirely unacceptable. Additionally, the reports need to be taken seriously by management instead of dismissing them as, the way it is.Local aviation safety organization have not taken any initiative to press the issue, because they do not see it as an issue. We just complain to complain. Something bad is going to happen. The interference, the equipment, whatever it is, is going to fail. At a time when a controller isn't saving altitude. When they're betting on something working out. This is an unacceptable level of tolerance for a very critical frequency in extremely busy airspace. Everyone who reads these reports, who gets told about these reports, and subsequently dismisses them should be ashamed of the lack of responsiveness and attentiveness to what could potentially be a catastrophic issue someday. Additionally, the response from management of, if the frequency fails use your Emergency Communication System (ECS) is further unacceptable. Anyone who has had to do a frequency check on an ECS knows it's an unreliable way to communicate with an aircraft, at best. At worst, it would make the problem worse. They are hard to hear, at best you'll get a 4x4 frequency check from a pilot on it, it's clear they are not meant for daily repeated use. I fear the day I would have to use an ECS to make more than 1 - 2 transmissions, hopefully to get all the aircraft onto another working frequency. We need working, functioning equipment in our facility to do our jobs properly and feel comfortable and safe doing that job all the time no matter the traffic level or time of day. Recent responses indicated a faulty security camera was determined to be the issue and it had been rectified. The security camera either was not the problem or not solved as 125.0 continues to have issues. More recent responses indicate that facility leadership identified 2 outages on 125.0 from months ago to present. I've reported this issue upwards of 20 times. This is not an isolated incident and it happens more often than the Review Team, aviation safety organization, FAA, and other entities realize. The dismissal of these safety reports is inexcusable.

I the First officer Started the leg segment as pilot flying. The flight was uneventful until approach was started. As we got closer to ZZZ the weather conditions continued to deteriorate. We both discussed and decided that Autoland would be the best course of action. We decided the captain would take the controls. We briefed that if the conditions improved that I would take the controls back and complete the segment. After a positive transfer of controls, we briefed the Autoland from the briefing guide. Went through and talked about different expectations and threats about Autoland including the go-around. Then conducted a full arrival and approach briefing. We had all the required equipment. We set up for runway XXR. After we received landing data we decided due to being a shorter and wet runway we would do flaps 40 and auto brakes 3. As we begin getting vectors ATC notified us we would be vectored thru the approach course for separation. We rejoined the approach and engaged the second autopilot. We were completely configured flaps 40 at target airspeed with the landing checklist complete by 1,500 ft RA. All FMA annunciations were correct. The appropriate call outs were made. As we got closer to the runway about 50-70 feet RA the autopilot disengaged. We both experienced the startle and surprise affect. The aircraft nose pitched down quickly. The captain applied back pressure to the elevator to arrest a higher than normal descent rate. The aircraft made contact with the runway which resulted in a bounced landing. We commenced a go-around and all of the callouts were made. During the go-around HDG mode would not engage; we recycled the flight directors. We overshot our heading by about 15 degrees. I ask for the aircraft to come left as HDG as mode was restored. We started to increase speed, I called ""Check Speed"" which was promptly corrected. We were expecting a published go around procedure but received a different heading and altitude. ATC asked for a reason for go-around during a high area of vulnerability. I asked them to standby. When we got established downwind and in a medium area of vulnerability we discussed fuel, our alternate, spoke briefly about what happened, and plans for the Autoland if it were to disconnect again. I also brought up on the bounced landing the off-scheduled light illuminated. We went through the procedure and the aircraft was confirmed to be set to the correct elevation. We reprogramed the FMC and set up for a second approach. We did not get a chance to make a PA to the passengers or call the Flight Attendants. During the second attempt we were fully configured flaps 40, landing checklist complete, FMA normal by 1,500ft RA. The second attempt was successful and uneventful. After the flight concluded we had a very thorough debrief that included the entire flight from start to finish. After we ran the termination checklist we debriefed on what went wrong with the Autoland and the missed approach and also what went well in regards to handling the startle and surprise of the autopilot disconnecting. We spoke in great detail of the missed approach and the Autoland procedure. We spoke about our high angle of attack during the bounce/go-around and the potential for a tail strike. Due to the possibility of a tail strike the captain did conduct a post flight exterior inspection and found no evidence of a tail strike. I did learn a lot about the Autoland capabilities, vulnerabilities, and how to be more aware as a pilot monitoring. The captain debriefed the Flight Attendants, and the outbound captain. Throughout the entirety of the flight the safety of the aircraft or the passengers was never in jeopardy. All SOP's were compiled with and a safe go-around was initiated. In conclusion I believe we handled the situation well. We communicated as a crew and put the flight path first.During a go-around from XXR in ZZZ, ATC issued instructions for an altitude of 2000 and right turn to a heading. Immediately after I was asked for a reason for the go-around. Due to this being a high area of vulnerability I asked ATC to standby. During the go-around I was the pilot monitoring. As we did, our call outs heading mode would not engage. I recycled the flight directors and reselected HDG mode. During this time we passed our heading by about 15 degrees. I stated the aircraft needed to come back to the left and it was promptly corrected. This was a brief and minor deviation. We were never informed of any deviation. I take full responsibility for the deviation.

On Flight ZZZ ZZZZ, we were at cruise at FL370. The FA called and said there was a burning smell at 12D. Passenger at 12D said she was watching a movie and heard a popping sound in her ear pods or headset and the TV monitor went blank. The FA began investigating and pull the seat cushion off and turned off a toggle switch to turn off power to the seat. The junction box was hot. Turning off the toggle switch also turned off power to seat 11D. Both passengers were moved to economy seats. I talked with the purser and she said everything was under control with the seat. I had dispatch CALL ME on SAT Voice. Talked with both Dispatch and Maintenance Control and Maintenance Control said there was nothing more the FA could do. I talked with Dispatch and we agreed to continue the flight. I talked with the flying FO and we talked about possible diversion points which we were flying over ZZZ1 and ZZZ2. I also saw ZZZ3 about 160 miles up ahead if we needed to divert somewhere. Soon after I hung up the SAT Voice call, the Purser called back up and she said 2 FA were using Fire Extinguishers on the junction box and it was starting to heat up again with smoke. I gave the flying and talking duties to the Flying FO. I called up the Relief pilot on his break and asked if he would help the FA. I did another SAT Voice call and talked with Dispatch and told him the situation was getting worse. I told him I wanted to [request priority handling] and we could go to ZZZ3 or ZZZ4 almost equal distance. Dispatch said ZZZ4 and I agreed. I told him to [request priority handling] with ATC and also told the flying FO to declare us a [priority] aircraft and go to ZZZ4. Another FA called up and I talk to him and told him we would divert to ZZZ4. He said they were using the fire extinguisher still on the seat but it was under control. I asked if he thought we would need to evacuate the aircraft after landing and he said no, everything was under control and we should go to the gate to let Fire Fighter look at the seat after we got to the gate. I asked if he needed the Relief pilot to help them out but he said the had it under control, so I had the Relief pilot come back up to the cockpit to help with the divert to ZZZ4. Dispatch ACARS us and asked if we were going to land overweight or dump gas. I believe we were going to land overweight of about 5,000-XX,000 lbs. and I felt it was best to land overweight with a possible fire onboard. We got set up in FMC and FO suggested the longest Runway of XXL, MAX AUTO brakes, Flaps 30. I asked for the ILS XXL. I completed the descent checklist and briefed the approach and an exit plan. Talking with the purser, she still agreed to taxi to the Gate and NOT evacuate. I gave the FA Prepare the Cabin for Landing announcement. I asked the other 2 pilots how they felt and if I missed anything. They both said they were good. I told them we are all good and lets not rush anything. I asked the Flying FO that we would be landing a little overweight and if he wanted to continue flying and make the landing. Since he had been flying I felt it was safest for him to make the landing. At about 1,000 AGL iI notice our GLW was at 431.2. After that we got a caution that both Packs Failed. I said to continue the short approach and we landed.FO made a nice smooth landing and the MAX AUTO Brakes worked great. I took over the airplane on the runway and exited the runway. Fire Trucks we waiting for us on the taxi way when we cleared. We talked with Ground and Crash Fire Rescue and told them we would like to taxi to Gate XX. CFR said everything looked good to them and asked if we had hot brakes. The highest we saw was 6.1 in the caution area. I taxied slow and parked at Gate XX. The FA kept the people in their seat and the Fire Fighters came onboard. The Fire Fighter came to the cockpit and said everything was under control and nothing was hot. We did our checklist and wrote up the overweight land and the seat 12D. I thank all the passengers as they deplaned. The mechanics came on board and looked at the seat 12D. I asked one of them if they found the problem. He said that the FA over reacted because there was only smoke and no fire. I told him I was [not] gong to take the airplane over the ocean like that.I want to commend both my flying crew and all the Flight Attendants for a great and professional job they did in handling the situation. Everyone communicated and worked well together and got the airplane and passenger safely on the ground

I was PIC and also pilot-flying for all legs of a trip. We boarded our passengers for the live leg (Part 135) to TEB. The SIC briefed the passengers and confirmed that they intended to hold the infant in their lap for the flight. The safety briefing included instructions on requirements for seat belt use.We were cleared to taxi to runway 25 and ran the taxi and before takeoff checklists as usual. We were departing under IFR and the current weather included snow flurries and a broken to overcast ceiling with clear skies above the cloud layer. I briefed the takeoff and departure with the SIC which included the usual go/no-go decision points and also that we would climb above the clouds and cancel IFR once in VMC above the clouds and proceed under VFR to our destination (TEB).Tower instructed us to line-up-and-wait on runway 25 and advised that we were waiting for Departure Control to accept us after the jet that had departed before us had reached 5000' MSL. During this time the SIC again asked the passengers if they had their seat belts fastened as instructed during the safety briefing. The SIC said that they confirmed that their seat belts were fastened.We were cleared for takeoff and to climb on runway heading to 5000' MSL. We then took off and began a normal departure climb. After takeoff the SIC began the 'After Takeoff' checklist. I was hand-flying the aircraft and then engaged the autopilot as we were climbing through approximately 1000' MSL. The SIC then said 'go right, turn right' and instructed me to fly through a hole in the cloud layer. He then called Departure Control and cancelled IFR and asked to proceed VFR to our destination at 12500'. We were still below the cloud layer at this point and I was confused by his instructions to make a right turn to fly through the hole as this was not what we briefed and there was no obvious reason for me to do this.I was still in the process of configuring the plane for the climb. The SIC again said to turn right so I moved the heading bug to initiate a right turn. Shortly thereafter we hit severe-extreme turbulence. This was one solid jolt where the plane was momentarily uncontrollable and everything in the cockpit (soda cans, phones, iPads, etc.) hit the ceiling. I believe I disconnected the autopilot shortly before we encountered the turbulence or shortly thereafter. I was attempting to regain control of the aircraft and we got an over speed alarm several times as we were leveling off and within 10-15 KIAS of Vmo which is 260 KIAS below 8000' MSL. Everything in the cabin that wasn't secure also hit the ceiling. This included the passengers as they had apparently either unfastened or loosened their seat belts even though the 'fasten seat belt' sign was still illuminated. Once I had regained control of the aircraft the SIC went into the cabin to check on the passengers and then to get things cleaned up.During the time the SIC was in the cabin I was configuring the aircraft for the remainder of the climb to 12500' MSL and direct ALB (as instructed by ATC).Upon returning to the cockpit the SIC said that the passengers had some bumps but were otherwise ok and uninjured. The SIC then asked why I didn't turn right immediately and fly through the hole in the clouds and I said that we had not briefed that and that I didn't see a good reason to do it immediately. We then had a brief heated discussion and I then said that I was not going to discuss it further until after we landed and that we were going to concentrate on flying the remainder of the flight.After the flight the SIC said he had received a call that the passengers were claiming they were injured. There was some discussion between them regarding the safety briefing, etc. and apparently the passengers later decided that they were fine and dropped any claim of injury.Initially we thought we may have encountered turbulence related to the clouds and snow showers but after some thought the SICsaid he believed we had encountered the previously departed aircraft's wake. This makes sense to me as well.After taking some time to reflect upon this situation, I believe that I reacted to the SIC command to fly through the hole in the clouds in error. I should have continued to fly the departure as briefed. The SIC has nearly 20,000 hours of pilot time and many more hours in the CE-525 than I do (I was below 100 hrs PIC in the CE-525 at the time of this flight and still on Initial Operating Experience and 'High-Minimums') and is more comfortable doing such maneuvers in the aircraft than I am. I believe the fact that he has much more experience played a role in me attempting to comply with his instructions. As PIC, I should have been firm in refusing to follow the SIC instructions to fly through the hole in the clouds and continued the departure as briefed. It isn't possible to know if this would have resulted in avoiding the severe-extreme turbulence encounter but I believe it would have been the correct action and likely would have avoided the aircraft over speed alarm.

We were assigned to fly from ZZZ-ZZZZ as our second and last leg of the day. We ended up swapping tails after the first jet we were assigned had a maintenance issue. We stepped to the new tail where preflight, taxi, takeoff (Runway XXL), and climbout were expeditious and unremarkable. I was the First Officer acting as Pilot Monitoring and the Captain was the Pilot Flying. We climbed out on the ZZZZZ5 [departure] up to our planned cruising altitude. The entire flight took place in Day VMC. At approximately XA15Z, we were approaching ZZZZZ. The Auto Pilot ""A"" (CA side) had been on for a while at this point with no issues. ZZZZZ is a waypoint on the boundary between the ZZZ1 and ZZZZ1 FIR's approximately halfway across the ocean. Just prior to ZZZZZ, I heard a 'click' and the Autopilot disconnected and my (FO side) PFD lost Airspeed, Altitude, Attitude, Heading, Flight Director (including RNAV course guidance), and several other indications, all replaced with warning flags. The CA's PFD, MFD, Flight Director, FMC, and the Auto Throttle were unaffected and functioned normally; he immediately began to manually control the aircraft. As we began to look around for annunciator lights we noted the IRS2 FAULT light was on, as were the ALTN lights on both EEC's (all on the overhead panel). The CA attempted to reset the Autopilot with no success. As we were rapidly approaching the FIR boundary and the end of US ATC control, I suggested that we request to hold at ZZZZZ, the CA concurred, and I requested the hold with ZZZ1 ATC, who approved the request and let us choose the leg length. We did not declare an emergency at this point. I built the hold in my FMC (both were still working) and the CA's side system displayed and provided Flight Director guidance for him to follow. We began a direct entry turn to the right (to the North) as he and I decided to run the '(NG) IRS FAULT' Checklist. We were fairly certain at this point that the Right Side ADIRU had likely failed. We had great coordination and were very deliberate with each step of the checklist, which led us to decide to select Attitude Mode on the right side IRS (step 10) as I had no useful information whatsoever displayed on my PFD (in accordance with step 9). The checklist directed us to 'Maintain straight and level, constant airspeed flight' for approximately 30 seconds. I let ATC know we would be doing that (we were heading approximately North at this point) and they offered to just let us continue a North Heading in lieu of holding, which we accepted. 30 seconds later, my attitude indicator and heading card were restored (sort of-the heading was operating in free mode and was basically just a directional gyro and had to be routinely updated), but I still didn't have a flight director, navigational guidance, airspeed, altitude, and a couple of other items. Since we were in a degraded navigational state, had great weather between us and ZZZ1, and were still under control of ZZZ1 ATC, the CA decided to return to ZZZ1 (which I agreed with). At some point around this time I sent the first message to Dispatch letting them know we had an IRS2 Failure and would be returning back to ZZZ1. We discussed running the Airspeed Unreliable checklist, which I began to skim, but we decided that it was inapplicable and did not address the issue as the CA side PFD was fully functional and his airspeed indications matched those of the standby instrument. I searched for some way to get airspeed and altitude data from his ADIRU to my PFD, but couldn't find a checklist that could get me there, and there was an ominous warning in the 'Instrument Switching' checklist against linking all navigation information displays to a single source. I pointed out that I still teach at a flight school on the side and am used to flying cross cockpit if need be. I do not recall the exact timing or order of the following, but at some point after I ran the IRS Fault checklist and we were pointed North the following occurred: I noted to the CA that we were no longer RVSM compliant and we requested a descent out of RVSM airspace, ZZZ1 descended us to FL280. An FA called up asking what was going on as pax had noticed that we'd turned around. The purser reported that a passenger was upset and complained that we were kidnapping her. This apparently did not escalate; the FA's later said they were able to calm her down. There were several communications between the CA and the FA's on intercom including a brief. I offered to give the CA a break from hand flying, he gave me the aircraft which I began to hand fly referencing cross-cockpit instrumentation. The CA reviewed the checklist I'd run and ran the '(NG) EEC Alternate Mode' checklist and elected to keep the Auto Throttle ON at the end, the Auto Throttle worked normally throughout the flight. The CA and I coordinated with dispatch on our return to base, and with the flight attendants and the pax on what was happening and why. The CA requested priority handling with ATC and passed his intention to return to ZZZ1. ZZZ1 ATC cleared us direct to ZZZZZ2 for the ZZZZZ2 Arrival, expecting Runway XY (which is what we wanted). ATC told us that XY was unavailable and to expect XZL, I reprogrammed the FMC (the CA was flying again at this point) for the ILS Runway XZL. I attempted to run landing data twice with no success and performance errors. ACARS was working fine the whole time, but landing data just wouldn't come through. I requested it from dispatch who ran if for us and it printed out fine. The Descent, Approach, and Arrival were uneventful. We taxied clear and all the way to the gate.

On Day 0 we were operating flight ABCD with service to ZZZ1 from ZZZ2. We closed the door on time at XA:32. We called for push clearance from Ground Control with positive for deice. Once appropriate checklist were complete, we called for taxi clearance to deice location, which was the air carrier ramp just north of gate XX. The deice pad was occupied by another aircraft and Ground Control provided taxi instruction to 1,2,3 short of 4. As we were waiting there, iceman contacted us that the deice truck had run out of fluid and they needed to go back and get the other truck with fluid, but to taxi into position and they will meet us there with the deice truck. Once the pad become available, Ground Control gave us taxi instructions to the deice pad, I called the flight attendant (FA) to make sure everybody was still in their seats and she advised that someone was in the restroom. We let Ground Control know that we had a passenger up and had to wait until everybody was seated before taxing to deice pad. Once we were in the deice pad, we configured using the app and requested full body type I and IV. The iceman advised they were doing ""spot treatment"" and that type IV started at XB:15 on the left side and they worked around to the right side doing this spot treatment technique. Once deice procedure was complete, Iceman made contact and we reconfigured using the app and started the timer for XB:15. We then requested taxi instructions to Runway XX from Ground Control and they provided 1, 5 hold short of Runway XY. We made our way to 5 and contacted Tower holding short of Runway XY with a request to do a cross bleed start. Was advised to hold short for landing traffic and cross bleed start approved on 5. We waited to cross the runway to begin the crossbleed start procedure. Tower provided final taxi instructions of cross Runway XY at 5, 6 to XX. We performed the crossbleed start procedure on 5, completed the taxi checklist and noticed a within limits fuel inbalance of 400 lbs light on the number 1 engine, and that we would correct it in the air. We received takeoff clearance on 6 and I slowed down a bit to get times and temps, when the Tower Controller advised Runway XX landing traffic was 15 minutes out. We took the runway after before takeoff checklist complete and took off Runway XX on the ZZZZZ SID.Normal takeoff profile to climb segment. The climb segment was IMC conditions. After takeoff checklist complete at appropriate time with handover to Departure Control. We made a verbal note that we made the SID restriction of at or above 5000 feet at ZZZZZ1. We recived an EICAS message for fuel inbalance while in the climb. We started to correct this issue by going to LOW1. At approximately 5300 feet we heard a light thump, experienced an adverse yaw, followed by an ENG 2 out EICAS message. I verbalized we had an engine failure and First Officer (FO) had good directional control. I [requested priority handling] with ATC for engine out, SOB and fuel onboard. We received a heading and altitude of 6000 and time to run checklist. FO verbalized he had flight controls and I confirmed and started running the QRH checklist for ENG 2 out. Initially, we advised ATC we would return to ZZZ2. After running the QRH for ENG 2 out with an unsuccessful air start attempt after checking all fluids, the one engine inoperative approach and landing checklist, and the overweight landing checklist we decided to divert to ZZZ for better weather conditions, longer runway, and additional time.On the way to ZZZ, I made contact with dispatch via ACARs. I made contact with FA via interphone with specific issue at hand and made a general mechanical issue PA to the passengers with a diverting notice to ZZZ.I started grabbing all landing data to ZZZ. We initially planned for Runway XZR but ATC advised of current winds which had a considerable tailwind component so we agreed to Runway XAL. I advised ATC to have the Crash Fire Rescue (CFR) trucks ready. Decent checklist complete from the QRH. They provided vectors for a right downwind approach and we requested a 10 mile final which was all VMC conditions. The air traffic controller gave us vectors to join the final approach course followed with a mention that the ILS was out of service. We joined the final visually and I changed the approach to RNAV Runway XAL and received Flight Path Angle (FPA) and lateral guidance from flight instruments. We were fully configured for landing and stable throughout the entire visual approach, with landing checklist complete from the QRH.After parking brake set on the runway, I immediately went to the PA and made the announcement ""this is your Captain, remain seated, remain seated, remain seated"". I requested the CFR trucks to check the number two engine for any signs of fire and heat signatures. The CFR reported no issues observed and that they would follow us to the gate out of precaution. We requested and received taxi instructions to the gate. Clear of hold short lines, after landing checklist complete and FO contacted operations for gate assignment. We contacted Ramp Control for ramp entry to the gate XY followed by a parking checklist.

We departed Runway XX in ZZZ, at approximately 2,000 ft and 210 kts, we received EICAS message ""Yaw Damper Fail"" and moments later followed by ""Rudder System 1-2 INOP."" Asked the First Officer (FO) who was pilot flying, 'how does the aircraft feel? If you need the rudders they will feel stiff and require more pressure.'FO was pilot flying (PF and I transferred radios to him, and I began to run the QRH for 'Rudder System 1-2 INOP.' Completed the QRH and pushed out the Rudder Shutoff 2. This then only showed Rudder System 2 INOP.We elected to continue to ZZZ1 since there are longer runways, larger emergency vehicle presence, and we needed time to complete the QRH. ZZZ had Runway XY/XZ closed.After we had completed the QRH for the Rudder System INOP, we then completed the QRH for 'Yaw Damper Fail.' We were then able to regain the Yaw Damper and Autopilot.We [requested priority handling] with ZZZ Approach, requested Runway XAC, and asked for emergency vehicles to standby as a precautionary measure. ZZZ Approach gave us priority handing and had us go direct to ZZZZZ and descend and maintain 8,000 from 12,000 and expect the Visual XAC. I (pilot monitoring (PM)) set up the Flight Instruments, Radios, and FMS for Runway XAC and briefed the approach while the FO was pilot flying (PF). Advised the Flight Attendant (FA) what was occurring and that it was a precautionary landing and we did not plan to evacuate. I then made an announcement to the passengers advising them of the precautionary landing, and to remain seated with seatbelts fastened. The message to Dispatch did not send advising of our problem. We later saw it never sent once we were safely on the ground taxing to the gate.With this priority handling we were given direct ZZZZZ and then once closer we were given a heading of 030 to join the LOC and cleared for the visual approach Runway XAC. ZZZ Approach advised that we were in trail of a heavy. Thankfully we were high and stayed away from the heavy's wake. With the priority handling and short cut from the arrival onto the approach, ZZZ Approach still had us high and having us descent at 1,500 FPM or greater to get on glide slope. Once established on the final approach course and descent checklist complete, we had a possible transfer of controls where I became PF and FO became PM.Autopilot was disengaged at approximately 4,000 ft, as a way to better feel the plane's handling characteristics and to more easily get on glide slope and on speed for the visual approach XAC by the FAF. By 3000 ft we captured glide slope. The flight controls were feeling as normal and the redundancy in the rudder system was working correctly. We safely landed on Runway XAC. Once at a safe speed I used the tiler to slightly maneuver the nose wheel to the right to make sure we had nose wheel steer. We did have nose wheel steering and cleared the runway at Taxiway 1 and pulled into the ramp at [spot] XX and set the parking brake. We then cancelled the [priority handling] since we had operable steering and then completed the after landing checklist. I advised the FA and passengers that we safely landed in ZZZ and to remain seated with seatbelts fastened and that we were going to shortly start moving again on the ramp on our way to our assigned gate.Upon taxing to the gate we messaged Dispatch about the priority handling and system failure, and then called ZZZ Operations to advise them to have extra staff on hand at the gate to answer any passenger questions and concerns after the event. This way it provided the FA some help with assisting passengers. FO completed a post flight inspection of the hydraulic systems and the aircraft and everything looked normal. Reported the incident with Maintenance Control and Dispatch and answered all questions asked. Completed logbook entries for the Rudder System Failure. Aircraft had recently come out of a heavy check and had been in long term storage.The training department has done a great job with training us pilots and flight attendants. The procedures and training in place helped maintain positive control of the aircraft and successfully determine the priority of which EICAS indications to tackle first. FA stayed calm, cool, and collected. This assured passengers everything would be okay. FO was a rockstar.! He handled radios and flying the aircraft by hand while I completed the QRH to try and regain at least one of the rudder systems and then once safe we engaged the autopilot to test it integrity and reduce his work load while I was doing procedures.

I was the PM. We leveled off at FL350 after departure from ZZZ1. Upon leveling off we had a BRK (Brake) FAULT RH (Right) and BRK FAULT LH (Left) display on the EICAS for approximately 10-20 seconds . I got out the QRH and started to run the QRH procedures then the EICAS messages extinguished. The EICAS message seemed to stay displayed longer than just a spurious message. My FO and I decided to continue to run the QRH and follow through with the QRH procedures. Due to the possibility of not having some of the brakes and having to use the emergency brake to stop upon landing. We , my FO and I, decided to have the FA's (Flight Attendants) prepare the cabin to brace upon landing and for a possible emergency evacuation on the runway with the possibility of a brake and tire fire and to have CFR (Crash Fire Rescue) on standby. I informed MX (Maintenance) through the ACARS that we had the BRK FAULT RH and BRK FAULT LH EICAS messages and that I had written it up. I then informed Dispatch through the ACARS of the issue and that we had not declared an emergency. Dispatch informed me through ACARS that she let ZZZ know. I called the FA's with the normal cab call. The call to the FA's happened at approximately 33 minutes from landing. The FA's and I conferred and I let them know that this should be a normal landing but just in case we didn't have our normal braking that we could veer off the runway and that there was a possibility of a brake and tire fire. I informed them that I would like them to prepare for bracing upon landing and a possible emergency evacuation. Since the wind was from the north and we were landing on Runway XXL in ZZZ, I informed the FA's to expect to evacuate on the right side of the aircraft but to still look out of the windows to determine the most safest side to evacuate the aircraft due to the possible brake and tire fire. I went through with the FA's. I then informed the passengers over the PA of the situation. I reassured them that I was expecting a normal landing but that just in case of a brake issue we were going to prepare the cabin for the possibility of having braking issues. I then asked , I believe it was ZZZ Center, to advise ZZZ Approach that we were requesting CFR to be on standby due to the possibility of not having full brakes when landing and the possibility of a brake/ tire fire upon landing. When we received our frequency change to another controller he referred to us as a [priority] aircraft. I asked ATC if they had [given us priority handling] and the controller said that they [had given us priority handling]. I then put XXXX in the transponder and used the term [priority] aircraft in our call sign. I checked in with the FA's approximately 20 minutes later to see if they were ready with the cabin prep and if they were ready to land. They said that they were almost finished and needed a few more minutes. We were handed over to ZZZ Approach and they asked if we needed more time. I requested a 3-5 minute delay vector. I called the FA's again at 3 minutes into the delay vector and they said that they were ready. We had approximately 2900lbs on the FOD (Fuel Over Destination) at this time and we were on a right downwind for XXL. We were approximately 12 to 15 nm from the field. I informed ATC that we were ready for the approach. ATC turned us in and cleared us for the ILS XXL approach. We were approximately 3-4 nm from the FAF inbound and our FOD was indicating 2600 lbs. I then declared to ZZZ Tower that we would be landing below minimum fuel. I asked Tower to relay to CFR that there was a possibility of a tire and brake fire upon landing. The Tower asked CFR on Tower frequency if they copied my transmission and CFR verified on Tower frequency that they copied my transmission. I announced the Brace, Brace command over the PA at 300-400 AGL. Upon landing the braking action was normal. We came to a stop on the runway. I informed the passenger cabin that we had a normal landing and that everything was good. We landed with 2540 lbs FOD. Tower asked us if we would like to have CFR inspect our brakes. We said yes and ATC cleared us to turn right onto [Taxiway] 1 and then right onto 2. We did as advised and came to a stop shortly after turning onto Taxiway 2. CFR inspected the brakes and said that they didn't see anything wrong with our landing gear. Tower asked me if we wanted CFR to escort us to the gate. Since our brakes responded normally and there were no EICAS messages displayed and CFR's inspection indicated nothing wrong with the brakes I decided to taxi in with no CFR escort. In hindsight I would have had CFR follow us. We then taxied in with no further events. A note for the minimum fuel call. We were going to use specific speeds after leveling off at FL 350. Once we had leveled at our cruising altitude of FL350 our FOD was Indicating 3500lbs. Our release FOD was 3555 lbs and we had 684 lbs of extra fuel. System wanted, I think .67M. Our Mach buffet 1.5 G margin was .62M to .80M. We would have been close to the dot so we ran the ""What If"" on the PERF INIT (Performance Initialization) page for .70M. The fuel required was the same for .67M as it was for .70 M. So, we set .70 M as our cruise speed. We were still indicating 3500 lbs FOD. I believe having the delay vector combined with a long final and configuring early with flaps full, as per the QRH contributed to the minimum fuel call.We were monitoring the FOD and I felt the FA's just needed a little more time to prepare the cabin. If it was any longer I would have advised the FA's that we were going to have to land soon. However, I think that I would have checked with the FA's sooner and facilitated a quicker cabin prep.

The following is an event that took place on the FBO ramp at the ZZZ airport, in a Citation Sovereign 680 jet. Looking back on it, it reads like an accident chain that, by the grace of God, didn't end in an accident, and no one was injured. The Sovereign is a jet that is required to operate with two pilots. Both pilots on this flight were type-rated and qualified to act as PIC. Our company had designated the other pilot as PIC for this two day trip. He flew the three legs on the first day. I was going to fly the two legs scheduled on this day - the second day - flying from the left seat. This arrangement was not at all unusual, and had nothing to do with what happened.Accident link #1 - We arrived at the FBO in plenty of time - about 1:15 before scheduled departure. We both worked on getting the aircraft ready. Preflight inspection, connecting the nose gear steering link, getting ice for the cooler and hot coffee for our passengers. I asked the PIC as to when he wanted me to start the APU and begin the cockpit setup. He said to start it :20 minutes before our scheduled departure time. In my opinion that was not early enough, but I didn't object. I felt it was within his purview to make that decision. Nonetheless, I did start it a couple of minutes early. Accident link #2 - After I started the APU I began our cockpit setup. Checking all the various systems and configuring for our flight. At this point the APU had been operating for about :05 minutes. About then the PIC called me and said the passengers are here. Now I knew we were going to feel rushed. I interrupted my cockpit setup flow and tuned in the ATIS and wrote that down, in preparation for getting our ATC clearance to ZZZ1.Accident link #3 - Our flight plan had been filed using Foreflight. The PIC had filed it, choosing the route recommended by the Foreflight app. Their recommended route works perfectly about 99% of the time, with only occasional minor changes. Normally one would contact ZZZ Clearance Delivery, but in this case ATIS advised to get the IFR clearance on Ground Control frequency, XXX.X I requested our clearance on that frequency. The controller was very busy. He advised said I would be getting 'a full route clearance' and to advise when I was ready to copy. I already had a pad and a pen and so I told him to go ahead. He proceeded to rattle off a completely different route than what we had filed with perhaps five or six intersections, without spelling their names, as well as a new SID and an airway. He spoke so fast I had to scribble and abbreviate in an attempt to keep up. I read it back barely. About that time our passengers were led out to the plane by the PIC, and I felt like I was way behind. In addition, I quickly realized that there was no way I could put our ATC clearance in our FMS's or iPads without knowing the spelling of those intersections. So I had to call Ground Control back and ask for the proper spelling. And then I had to put the pretty complicated revised routing in both the FMS's and my iPad. The PIC had, by now, sat down in the right seat and he programmed his iPad and tried to help me get finished in our setup. By now the passengers had been onboard for :05 to :10 minutes and we both felt the pressure of time.Accident link #4. The PIC pulled out the Before Start checklist and we started to run it, planning to use the checklist to catch anything we might have missed. But we rushed the checklist too, with him asking the next 'challenge' before I had completely answered the previous item. We were both allowing the pressure of time to affect us, and it was about to have very serious results!As I started the first engine (the right side), I noted there was no marshaller present, but we had encountered that situation many times, and I wasn't concerned. After that engine was stabilized at idle, I conducted a flight control / spoiler check, and proceeded to start the left engine. During that start a marshaller came out. With the second engine stabilized, I called for the 'After Start' checklist and we went heads down as we performed our checks and verified our systems functionality. It was then I felt something in the seat of my pants, and looked outside to see that we were rolling ! And we had already rolled about twenty feet !! The Parking Brake had never been set !! The marshaller had moved off to the side. I regained control of the aircraft and steered it in a 90 degree turn to the right to exit the ramp. I stopped the airplane at the end of the ramp so we could pull ourselves together. We took a few minutes to get calmed down and make sure everything that needed to be done, was done. We were both shaken up, and we slowed way down and checked and double-checked everything. Once we leveled in cruise, we debriefed this whole event, and talked about how lucky we were that an accident had not occurred and vowed that neither of us would allow time pressure to cause us to rush things, not ever again ! Lesson learned !! We both knew better !

On Day 0, at approximately XF23, I, Person A, while acting as PIC of a Gulfstream IV-SP, experienced a pressurization anomaly while on descent into the ZZZ airport. The crew has sufficient rest the day prior to the flight, and arrived at the aircraft at around XA30 to start pre-flighting the aircraft for a proposed 1H00 departure. All exterior and interior checks, as well as systems checks were completed per Gulfstream's Pilot Checklist. No anomalies were noted, and the pressurization checks passed with no defects noticed. The flight left the FBO ramp at around XF41 for departure on Runway XX at ZZZ1 airport. The aircraft then had climbed to altitude of FL410. The pressurization system operate normally and on schedule the whole time. At approximately XF13, we received a descent clearance to FL380. As selected a descent vertical speed of 1500 feet per minute, the autothrottles retarded the power and I felt a small pressure bump in my ears. I looked up and noticed a Bleed Manifold difference of 10 PSI from the left manifold of 24 PSI and the right manifold reading 14 PSI. I looked at the pressurization control panel and backed it up with the 'Triple-Needlel gauge and made the decision to expedite our descent. I informed the SIC to request a lower altitude to FL240 or lower. ATC had asked if we had any issues, and I stated that we are requesting the descent due to erratic pressurization readings and indications. We were then cleared to FL240. As I continued the descent to the lower altitude, the auto-throttles continued to regard the power to flight idle. This reduction in power resulted in less air coming into the cabin for sufficient pressurization. I then disconnected the autothrottles and pushed the power up to a point where I could see the bleed pressure increase. The pressurization system then started to climb to cabin at an increasing rate of up to 1700 feet per minute. I then tried to control the cabin rate through the Pressurization Control Panel Tapes. No change in rate. I then switched to ADC#2 and no change was noted. I then went to manual control to try and control the rate of pressurization and still no change. At this point we were descending through approximately FL290, and I then activated the right side anti-ice, in the attempts to increase bleed air by opening up the 10th stage air. The duct pressure increased to around 42 PSI on both sides, and the cabin started showing a slight descent in the cabin. The cabin pressure had rose to about 14100 and activated the cabin masks. We then received a Cabin Pressure Low annunciation, followed by Cabin Diff 9.8 (briefly flashed then extinguished), and a PAX CABIN OXYGEN on CAS (Crew Alerting System) message. As soon as we leveled off at FL240, the cabin had started a descent and was under 10,000 feet and continuing to descend. The previously stated CAS messages had all extinguished and were no longer displayed. We had now been level at FL240, for less than a minute when I then selected the Pressurization to 'Landing' mode and selected ADC#1 again and took it out of Manual mode. The system started operating normally at this point with the anti-ice selected on for increased air flow. No issues reoccurred until below 7,000' MSL, where the cabin started to climb and descend with no reason. We were then setting up for a visual approach to ZZZ airport when below 1000' MSL, the cabin started descending around 1200 feet per minute. Once we touched down, the cabin then started to show a climb again. The Cabin Altitude on the overhead pressurization panel showed 500'. Airport elevation was XXX' MSL. While taxiing in, I selected the pressurization to manual and opened the outflow valve full open. The cabin still showed a slight climb. I then deselected to Bleed Air to off, and it made no change to the climb. After approximately 10-15 seconds later, the cabin started to stabilize and finally fully equalized when the engines were shutdown. It of note to include as well, that while wewere at FL240, and had stabilized, the cabin descended to Sea Level, though showed a differential of 8.62. ATC had asked if we needed any assistance or if we were declaring an emergency. At this point, we had leveled off to a Sea Level altitude, aircraft had started acting normal, and oxygen was not needed. I informed ATC, that we are not declaring an emergency, that we were responding to an indication anomaly and needed no further assistance. I took this time to quickly go back into the cabin to check and ensure the passengers were OK and no one needed any medical assistance. Once I checked on each passenger, I informed the Lead and other passengers within earshot what had happened. Checklist was consulted and no checklist matched our situation except Loss Of Automatic Pressurization. We followed checklist and saw we had already complied with items.

On Day 0 while acting as Pilot Flying (PF) of the aircraft at ZZZ we had taxied from the FBO via taxiway 1 to runway XXR. Upon reaching XXR departure end, at [taxiway] 2, I approached the hold short line and stopped. Because we were number one for departure, I elected to hold the brakes rather than set the parking brake. An airline had been cleared by ZZZ Tower to land on runway XXR. In my estimation we had been sitting at the hold short line for between 30 and 60 seconds. Without warning the brakes failed and the aircraft began to roll toward the hold short line. After quickly confirming that braking was ineffective from both positions (PF and Pilot Monitoring (PM)), while near simultaneously receiving and recognizing the BRK FAIL CAS message it was determined the best course of action was to provide full left rudder turning the aircraft east on 2 and then north on 1 to the non-movement area directly north of 2. Throughout this movement the aircraft continued to accelerate. While I was maneuvering the aircraft on the taxiway(s) the PM made a declaration to ZZZ Tower of our failed brakes. Once clear of the taxiway and onto the non-movement area the PM applied the Parking Brake bringing the aircraft to a stop. Once stopped the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) was reference for the BRK FAIL CAS message and our company maintenance was consulted. It was determined by the crew and maintenance that the best and safest course of action was the hold in position until a tug could be arrange to tow us back to the FBO. Once the tug arrived, we shut down the engines and were towed back without incident.Once stopped, the PM advised the passengers of the situation and began to coordinate as appropriate with the companies Operations. ZZZ Tower had [requested priority handling] for us which resulted in Emergence Vehicles (Crash, Fire, Rescue) responding to our location. It is my recollection the ZZZ Tower asked for further details at which time our response was to ""standby"". The Fire Chief visibly inspected our aircraft and could not see any leaking fluids and also checked taxiway 2 for hydraulic fluid to which he reported that he did not observe any. Once assured that we were okay and not in need of their services the Emergency response vehicles departed. It is my understanding one emergency vehicle remained behind along with a ZZZ Airport Authority vehicle to provide an escort for our tow back to the FBO. At no time did the aircraft cross over the hold short line of Runway XXR. Once stopped in the non-movement area north of 2, all aircraft on 1, west of 2 were able to move up to 2and depart on Runway XXR. At least one aircraft on 1, east of 2 was blocked by our position. The only indication of a problem prior to the brake failure was a chatter or slipping of the brakes while coming to a stop at the hold short line of Runway XXR. Both crew members observed/heard the noise but attributed it to what appeared to be metallic plates or dissimilar material as part of the taxiway. A preflight inspection and final walk around inspection had been conducted with no abnormalities observed. This aircraft was flown earlier on this day from ZZZ1 to ZZZ by this crew with no observed deficiencies in the braking. A post flight inspection of the aircraft revealed no observed concerns, abnormalities, or deficiencies with the brakes or hydraulics. Once stopped, the PM advised the passengers of the situation and began to coordinate as appropriate with company Operations. My initial detection of the brake failure was the forward movement of the aircraft while I was applying brake pressure. Near simultaneous to that was a BRK FAIL (Brake Failure) CAS message received in the cockpit on the Primary Flight Display.At this time I cannot speculate what caused the brakes to fail. After confirmation of the brake failure the crew reaction was to steer the aircraft away from the active runway and onto the taxiway. Fortunately,there was a non-movement area north of 2 which was the safest location to move towards. With momentum and acceleration building, the aircraft was brought to a stop through the application of the parking brake. ZZZ Tower was advised of the brake failure when and as appropriate.I do not have any confirmed indications of impending brake failure to pass on to other aircrew at this time. We were fortunate that 2 was wide enough for us to maneuver and that there was empty ramp space north of 2 for us as well. My only recommendation would be to approach every hold short line with a planned exit strategy should they have a similar experience. In absence of addition details provided to ZZZ Tower by us, I appreciate their response with Emergency vehicle.

On the Day 0, I was called as the Inspector for Aircraft X blade lube card. After receiving the call I looked on the computer to see if there was any issues with this job card I was about to inspect. Upon looking at the job card I didn't see any issues Non routine s or turnovers that would prevent me from conducting the inspection. I gathered the tooling I normally use when conducting a blade lube inspection and went out to the aircraft. Upon arriving at the aircraft I noticed the Blades had already been removed and lubed, there were(2) Mechanics at the aircraft when I arrived. I asked if they removed the blades and they said NO, the previous shift removed the blades and presumably cleaned and lubed the blades as well. I asked if they knew if those guys were still there, the answer was NO, So I asked them where were they help, Because over at the line there's a minimum of (4) Mechanics doing this task. They told me it was only the (2) of them. I said okay have either one of you done this task before and the answer was No. I said okay and told them I was going to do my Pre inspection of the Blades and hub/disk since I did not witness the removal cleaning or lubing of the blades. I noticed the fan blades were not arranged in sequential order on the blade rack, The mechanics noticed this as well I told them that they were supposed to be in order. I moved on to the engine itself and noticed the hub/disk was also marked but not in a sequential order. I told the Mechanics that only the blades were to be marked and arranged on the blade rack in sequential order. I asked the mechanics did either of the witness the removal of the blades and who marked them and the hub/disk, The answer was No. Since the blades and hub/disk were both marked I assumed that the Removal Crew removed each blade and marked the blade and hub/disk where it was removed from but did not arrange the blades on the rack in sequential order or removed them in sequential order for whatever reason, I do not know. And since there was no issues with the blades or mapping I saw no reason not to reinstall the blades where they were marked on the hub/disk. I located the Number 1 blade on the blade rack and the location where it was to be installed on the hub/disk and told the Mechanics to reinstall the remaining blades on the position where they were marked on the hub/disk. I also marked the rear spinner cone with a piece of yellow tape noting the dimple and where it was to be aligned and installed after all the blades were reinstalled. I watched the complete Installation and had no issues with the reinstallation besides having to locate the unarranged blades on the blade rack and match it to the location marked on the hub/disk. The remainder of the installation went without any issues, it took close to 3 hrs because there were only (2) Mechanics who had never done the task before so there was a lot of on the job training. Along the way. I had no ideal that the markings on the hub/disk were not where the blades were supposed to be installed and have never had an incident like this before, as since last year when I was a Line Inspector I completed several blade lube inspections and several more prior to that never with any incidents. I told the Mechanics that they did a good job and thanked them. I also told them at the very beginning of this task to take their time so there would not be any mistakes on either part. Thats why it took longer than usual. I stamped my portion of the required inspection item (RII) and went back to the Inspectors office. I wasn't notified of this incident until Day 0 and told that needed to complete a report because of such. I had assumed that the engine would under go an engine run to verify the reinstallation of the fan blade before it was released back into an airworthy condition. If memory serves engine runs were conducted on the Line when I was there. It just make good sense in my humble opinion. This is all that I can recall at this time.Please call Text or Email with any other questions.Cause: The numbering on the blades and hub I believe caused this Incident along with no narrative on why the hub/disk was marked period. Example a Turnover or Non Routine or something to notify the incoming crew Inspector and mechanics on why both the blades and the hub/disk were marked. If I had that information I would have re-installed the fan blades as I have on previous blade lube inspections tasks without any issues. Suggestions: Whenever possible have the same Crew Inspector and mechanics perform the complete blade lube job card, I believe that will definitely alleviate any mistakes like this again, And also if there are any abnormalities such as the blades and the hub/disk both being marked do not leave any markings on the hub/disk. And leave a Turnover as well.Also, on the job card it should be re-vised to say sequential order instead of related slots.

Upon arrival in ZZZZ Airport our aircraft was met by inspectors (2 of them) for a Ramp Check. As the Captain of the flight I welcomed one inspector onboard the aircraft, accessed my Ramp Check checklist, and was informed that his colleague was joining the two first officers who were performing the postflight walkaround. Formalities were complied with as the inspector was provided with our crew, aircraft, and operations certification documentation. Upon inspection of the crew, aircraft, operational documentation including the trip envelope, General Declaration, NOTOC, maintenance log, etc. The inspector expressed his satisfaction with the findings as shown [on] the 'proof of ramp inspection form' sections flight deck, documentation, flight data, safety equipment, flight crew, and journey log book/technical log or equivalent.Shortly after, the remaining flight crew who had been doing the walkaround returned with inspector number two and provided inspector number one their aircrew certification credentials to his satisfaction. At this time the two convened with the Mechanic in the flight deck and began filling their paperwork.Inspector number one returned to the upper deck crew quarters to inform me that it would only be a few moments and they would finish their paperwork and that they had some remarks and 'findings' they needed to discuss with me prior to going to rest. Shortly thereafter, I was provided with the proof of ramp inspection sheet where it was discussed with the crew and I was obliged to sign it and retrieve a copy. The proof of inspection sheet detailed 6 remarks, 4 of which were categorized as 'general remarks,"" 1 that was categorized as category 1 'minor', and one that was categorized as category 3 'major.' All of the remarks fell under the categories of 'general aircraft condition' and cargo 'Dangerous Goods (DG).'The 4 general remarks were all included in in the 'general aircraft condition' section and are listed below.Aircraft dirty especially on landing gear struts ""shock absorbers."" Engine #2 vanes displaying wear and discoloration (this is my interpretation of the explanation given, the handwriting is near impossible to read to be exact). Upon next leg departure Maintenance explained that the wear was well within limits.Left-hand static port paint ""black"" peeling off. Again, upon next leg departure Maintenance explained this is fine, not a critical area and the static port is clear.2 rub strips loose on Engine #2. This was explained to me as strips included in the thrust reverser ""shroud."" Everything in the picture shown by the inspector appeared to be in place and present. However, he insisted it felt loose and ""wiggly"" to the touch.The one remark that was marked category 1 ""minor"" is listed below.One missing screw on right wing root, and one missing rivet on Engine #1 thrust reverser cowl. This was marked and discussed with Maintenance as ""corrective action before flight"" as referenced on the form, causing further delay to operation.Unfortunately, there was one category 3 ""major"" finding as listed below.DG tag incorrectly filled in. Upon briefing inspector number one was verbally suggestive that this was not a ""crew issue"" but an ""operator issue"" and agreed with me that the NOTOC was correct and the loading of the engine we carried was correct and safely secured per Loadmaster procedure and flight crew verification. However, the issue was that the warehouse load personnel had neglected to properly fill the tag on the load with the DG classification Information to match the NOTOC. This was marked ""information to authority and operator.""I believe the cause of the issue was a rushed operation due to the flight crew being called out to an aircraft that was nowhere near ready for departure. We sat onboard the aircraft for many hours awaiting the payload and when we were close to timing out, it seemed like there was a lot of added operational pressure on the ground crew to protectthe flight by rushing to get the loading job done. This likely led to the rush and error of the warehouse personnel neglecting to adequately fill in the DG tag attached to the aircraft engine being loaded on the main deck.My suggestion going forward is simple. In the future, perfect the decision-making process on calling a crew out of rest to show to an aircraft. I truly believe that the operation, attention to detail, and integrity of procedures will be protected if we keep every department involved with the certification, loading, ground and flight operations in a less stress, less rushed environment so that errors like this can be more adequately mitigated.

Departing ZZZZ there was convective activity around the airport. We originally taxied to runway XXL for departure, while holding short of runway XXL ground said they were not using XXL anymore and offered us runway XY, which I told them we were overweight for, they then offered us runway XZR. We sent for a new release that included XZR and we received one with X, but because the crosswind was close to 25 knots and varying greater I called the dispatcher and requested a release for XZR with Y, which we received. We were cleared to taxi to runway XZR. Ground let us hold short of 1 on taxiway 2 because we told them we had to load our numbers. With the parking brake set we updated the FMS, including building the XZR engine out departure procedure and a return to XZR, briefed the new runway and the ZZZZZ departure, reviewed the release, we discussed the weather and the possibility of a windshear and how we would mitigate that threat, we reviewed the ZZZZZ1 departure procedure off XZR and emphasized to bring the power back to climb power at 1500' and clean up at 3000', then we ran the runway change checklist, then we continued our taxi to runway XZR. We ran the Before Takeoff Checklist and we were soon cleared for takeoff runway XZR. We were cleared into position runway XZR and then rushed by the tower for an immediate takeoff because an aircraft was on a 6 mile final on the ILS XZR. I looked at the weather radar and didn't see anything significant along our route. We took off and climbed out and the first officer who was flying turned on the autopilot @ 400'. We were initially cleared to climb to FL250.From here on this is the best i can recollect, the rest seemed to happen very quickly.At 1500' CLIMB flashed and the first officer brought the power back to climb, at the same time I was looking at the radar to make sure we were clear of the convective activity and we also received a radio call from ZZZZ Departure. At about the same time @ 1500' I noticed the airspeed was getting slow so I said 'watch your airspeed'. The autopilot was not keeping up and pitching over as we would have expected to regain the airspeed. The first officer pushed the power up to TOGA. The airspeed started to increase and then it was sporadic fluctuating below VFE and right above VLS (Minimum Selectable Speed), the pitch was pretty steady between 5 and 10 degrees, this continued for a few seconds. At one point the airspeed surged rapidly close to VFE and I retracted the flaps from 2 to 1 to avoid over speeding the flaps. The airspeed was sporadic increasing and decreasing rapidly. The flight conditions were pretty stable and the other flight instruments appeared normal (altimeter and VSI were both indicating a steady climb and not sporadic) which led me to believe it wasn't a windshear, the only thing erratic was the airspeed indicator. We could not understand what the airspeed was doing, both of us commented on how erratic our airspeed indicators were, then the first officer said 'help me'. I said I think we have unreliable airspeed and called out the immediate action items that the first officer executed. 'Disconnect autopilot, auto-throttles and flight directors, pitch 10 degrees, climb power', during this the airspeed accelerated again, and the relief first officer unannounced moved the flap handle from 1 to 0 (which I didn't see because I was confirming the first officer set climb power). I told the first officer to maintain our current heading, I tried to tell ATC this but I wasn't sure ATC understood and I didn't want any traffic conflicts so I [requested priority handling] so we could fly our heading and keep the aircraft stabilized. Soon after while maintaining 10 degrees pitch and climb power the airspeed stabilized and we re-engaged the autopilot, flight directors and auto throttles. After getting above FL180 and away from the weather I expanded my team and called ZZZ Radio and spoke with the dispatcher, maintenance control, the duty pilot, and a specialist to discuss what happened and whether continuing to ZZZ was appropriate which we all decided it was. After the call, Captain A (relief captain) and I agreed that he and his First Officer would be the flying crew and they would complete the landing in ZZZ and my First Officer and I would be the relief crew.Additional Information:After the event the relief crew said they thought we overspeeded flaps 1 by 5-6 knots for < 3 seconds.I'm not sure if it was a contributing factor but later when we discussed what happened as a crew, the relief first officer brought up that the first officer (PF) during the airspeed fluctuation event moved the power from TOGA back to lower thrust or Climb (at least 4 to 5 times). The first officer confirmed that he brought the power back from TOGA to either lower or Climb when the airspeed would increase so as not to overspeed the aircraft. I only noticed the first officer move the thrust levers a couple times, which is when I had him set Climb power and leave the thrust levers there.After the event I noticed in the FMS the predicted landing fuel went from 24,000lbs that was displayed right before we took the runway to 15,000lbs. After discussion over the radio with the specialist we discovered that the 3 step climbs we loaded during pre-flight had dropped out, We reloaded the steps and the landing fuel showed correctly with 23,700lbs. I'm not sure if this was related to the event.

I was acting as pilot in command (PIC)/pilot flying (PF) in left seat of aircraft, flying at FL390, en route from ZZZ to ZZZ1. First indication of a problem was an amber GEN 4 OFF BUS message. Pilot monitoring (PM) pulled out QRH, we identified GEN 4 switch and reset as per QRH, which corrected the indicated problem. Approximately 20 to 30 minutes later, we simultaneously got amber GEN 1-2-3 OFF BUS and SHED BUS 1-2 OFF messages. Cabin Attendant later recalled that at this time she noticed Cabin lights starting to 'pulse' between full on and dim, without ever going completely off. We knew we had a serious electrical problem at this time. We requested descent to FL350 with intention of starting APU to guarantee we would have one functional generator in operation. Using QRH procedures we were able to clear the EICAS messages and have everything operational again, but were not 'trusting' the systems to remain functional. PM reviewed the QRH as we discussed possible scenarios and related options. As we leveled at FL350 we began to power up the APU. We then got an amber GEN 2 OFF BUS message. Before we had the opportunity to take any corrective action, we had a 'complete electrical failure' and 'everything went dark.' Standby attitude indicator (powered by an independent battery) remained active, so I focused on that for maintaining aircraft control. Within seconds, the APU became fully active, and the APU generator started to provide power to SOME systems. PM indicted 'I've got nothing on my side.' Cabin Altitude was also starting to climb. We requested priority handling, PM advised ATC we've had an electrical failure, and we needed an immediate descent. We were cleared down to 14,000 feet. I was hand flying with no autopilot, and we started down. PF and PM both donned Crew masks and reestablished communications. We discussed options and priorities, and determined the prudent course of action was to land at the nearest suitable airport. I recall ATC advising that ZZZ2 was about 30-35 miles away, and we accepted vectors in that direction (about 25-30 degrees to the right of our current course). As we descended, I looked back and made eye contact with some of the passengers. Cabin attendant was doing a fine job of keeping things relatively calm in the back. I also noted that we descended quickly enough to NOT have the passenger oxygen masks deploy. Approaching 14,000 feet we were cleared to continue descending to 11,000. I noted a cloud layer below and, not trusting that our anti-ice system would be functional, advised the PM that I would slow our descent rate to allow us to remain above the clouds. At 11,000 feet we removed our masks, while continuing our descent. We started receiving vectors for the ILS XX into ZZZ2. PM tuned the frequencies and we reviewed the approach plate. I maintained control using the standby attitude indicator while simultaneously referencing the 'green needles' on the Primary Flight Display (PFD). The ILS display appeared to be working properly, and matched the vectoring information we received from ATC (they vectored us across the LOC, and the needle appeared to follow, as well as seeing the 'glideslope was alive'). I hand flew the approach. When we started seeing lights on the ground out the side windows, we realized that the electrically powered windshield heat was also not operational. We had to continuously wipe off the windscreen to see ahead. Humorously, ATC gave us the wrong frequency for ZZZ2, but since we had the plates out on our EFBs, PM was able to make the call on the correct frequency. Tower cleared us to land. We noted on short final that our landing lights did not seem to be doing anything, but I was able to land by referencing the runway edge lighting. The Taxi Light was also providing minimal help, only illuminating perhaps 10 feet in front of the nose, so it was a long, slow taxi between the blue lights. Airport Fire Truck did a runway sweep behind us and followed us to the ramp, standing at the ready, but we did not require any assistance from them.THINGS THAT WENT WELL: -Proactively descending to appropriate altitude for APU start.-'Reading ahead' in the QRH to develop possible courses of action.-Good crew coordination and communication between PF and PM.-Good briefings and use of EFBs, with associated charts.AREAS TO IMPROVE:-Take less time in donning crew oxygen masks. (PF hand flying, so waited for PM to mask up and then complete a transfer of controls before PF donned mask)-Be ready for EXTREME high volume when donning mask. Be ready to turn down the volume. Just the amplified sound of our breathing was enough to drown out radio calls.-If possible, provide more information to the Cabin Attendant earlier in the process. Keep the 'whole team' In The Loop.-Have something dedicated to the Flight Deck specifically for use to wipe a fogged over windscreen. We got by using our hands, but a dedicated towel or rag would have been welcomed.

Upon arriving at flight planning, we were made aware of an inbound electric generator drive left write up. Our dispatcher had asked maintenance to fix it rather than the deferral they wanted as the fuel penalty to run the APU the entire flight was too great for our maximum taxi weight. We kept ourselves aware of the progress and understand they felt they had fixed it and were 'confirming' with a 20 minute engine runup . The Maintenance Release was cleared. We arrived at the cockpit to find the Maintenance Release had no explanation as to what was wrong with the generator or ultimate IDG (Integrated Drive Generator) auto disconnect due to over temp nor what they had done. I called maintenance and requested info. Person A at Maintenance Control said they added oil. I requested Mx (Maintenance) come to the cockpit for a clear understanding , as adding oil to a contained reservoir in IDG was suspicious to me. Where was the leak. Person B appeared, not the person that added the oil or had eyes on the possible leak..he was unreachable within 30 minutes. Person B said he only did the runup from the cockpit and knew they had added oil. I asked how much? How much does reservoir hold? He said he didn't know either answer as they just hit a fill line. Well, enough was lost to cause an over-temperature auto disconnect. Later 2 quarts addition was tossed about. Maintenance was happy with the integrity of the generator and the fact they had fixed any reason the IDG disconnected for us to take it to ZZZZ an almost XX hour flight. Knowing if it failed operating the APU would be necessary to protect the operating right generator. I asked if the Maintenance Release repairs could include full sentences that we could understand as it is our source of communication. We asked if this is then in fact a normal procedure to add oil to the IDG . Person B replied yes, that exhaust can take oil with it and the service check that once had IDG oil check had since removed the check, perhaps in the interest of cost savings? I had to take his word we would have an uneventful flight pertaining to this maintenance issue with the aircraft----as this falls in Company Maintenance licenses/profession. We had to be confident they performed the best maintenance in aviation. Approximately 2 1/2 hours later, apparently the 2 quarts had again , also leaked out and we lost the left generator and with increasing temperature the left IDG auto disconnected. There was no alarm electrically as the 777 super redundancy carried the load across the bus tie. We pulled up the checklist and manually pushed the IDG disconnect switch with next item calling for the APU start if available, I called dispatch to get some fuel burn numbers. Dispatcher was still on duty and tried to reach out when we asked once again to speak to maintenance. She was somewhat held up as her resources were again unavailable, like mx at the gate. Person B at Maintenance Control again was on the line, without any new direction, I asked for a supervisor as I had learned as much as possible from Person B and it wasn't enough, Person B dropped off the line without a supervisor picking it up. I asked for the 777 systems expert to learn more and a 320 person jumped on the line saying he couldn't help he was 320, Now we are delaying APU start until Dispatch and Operations did the math and confirm we can continue. We keep flying, flying , She is looking for Chief Pilot, I heard Person C or Person D mentioned. Neither ever got on the line.. so, Person E, a-320 specialist, nor 2 Chief Pilots available. I understand there was a going away party happening in Operations for the Dispatcher leaving the Chief Pilot desk after nearly a decade or so. Sad situation for a Company passenger flight if the event were in fact an emergency. The infrastructure is failing. Our skeletal operation will eventually bite us in the name of cost savings I suppose. We were asked to wait 10 minutes or so. But plan to possibly divert to ZZZ. I reiterated we will fly wherever they want us but the APU is coming on. Dispatch was not happy with fuel penalty continuing to ZZZZ---they were doing the math. A later conversation had Operations/Dispatch bringing up a fuel stop in ZZZ1. I shared my feelings that I was comfortable to keep flying but did not think it prudent to take it back in the air across the ocean once on the ground.....they returned with ZZZ as Pax (Passengers) can continue. We concurred and asked for reroute from Location A. We later requested fuel dump just outside of ZZZ2. We noticed they had the aircraft continuing after ZZZ to ZZZZ. I messaged dispatch that there was a possibility the next crew would refuse the aircraft and she replied they had a back up plane if that is the case. The crew in ZZZ did refuse the aircraft ending in XX. I again reiterated that I would fly as far as I could we had sound electrics. 4-5 maintenance technicians met us in the cockpit and immediately said it was a bad generator and it took the IDG with it. He said he also had a hunch the flight crew would not take it over the ocean but would do what they could. I heard later inquiring with maintenance back in ZZZ3 that the plane stayed in service domestically for 4-5 more days at that time burning the APU coast to coast as the IDG was leaking like a sieve. Too costly to put in Maintenance off the line for a new generator. This is not the airline of 30 years ago. Passing along maintenance for days. Another day all chillers out in aft galley. Maintenance wouldn't come unless I refused airplane. So I did. 8 days flying 14 hour flights with breakfast meat relying on inefficient dry ice. Chillers scheduled to be fixed in 3 more days(2 weeks total) when passing through ZZZ4. After refusal Mx comes on flips switch and gets 2 chillers back. 10 min. arrived at ZZZZ early. Summary, we were team players but we need a team.

Upon arrival at Gate XX we were informed by our gate agent that our airplane was waiting on maintenance. When we boarded the airplane the PCA (Aircraft Preconditioned Air Unit) was connected but not running so I called Operations for ramp to come over and turn it on. The APU was running providing power, but not air. Already knowing the tail, I radioed local maintenance to see if we could run the bleed air and asked them if they had an ETA the logbook would be ready. I was told that they were waiting to complete the logbook, but there was no ETA when that would be. Not too long after that another mechanic arrived at the plane and I asked him what the issue was and were told that the previous week they had found metal chips in the engine oil and after a subsequent inspection that night they had recovered additional metal fragments from the aft sump, but the inspection procedure they had been operating under did not give any guidance about what to do in the event they found metal in the subsequent inspection. That was what they were waiting for from engineering. The mechanic also showed us a picture of what I believe he said was the first set of fragment they had recovered the previous week. The fragments were laid out on a grid to show their relative size. He said they believe they were from a bearing in the #1 engine based on the studies that had been done on them. After being informed that engineering had approved an additional inspection schedule I formally initiated the procedure I was questioning the safety of the aircraft. I had previously initiating the procedure with my original dispatcher, but at the request of her supervisor we all decided to wait for the engineer's decision before pulling that trigger. I spoke the Chief Pilot where we had a professional discussion about the situation but ultimately decided to wait until I had the logbook so I could review the history of the airplane as best I could. One question I did get from the Chief Pilot was ""would my decision to refuse the plane change if I hadn't been informed by the local mechanic about the actual condition of the engine."" I found this question to be disturbing for obvious reasons. Once the logbook arrived I review the last few pages to find that the plane had been operating on a deferral for the #1 EMCD (Electronic Master Chip Detector) and that deferral had been cleared. It looked as if that was the deferral that was used when the metal fragments were originally discovered. I phoned Maintenance Control to verify and to ask if, since the airplane had required inspections before each takeoff under the original MEL, would continue to be the case. After reviewing his information he said it would not. Moving forward under the new guidance from manual they weren't required to inspect it again for and additional 50-70 flight hours. This didn't appear to add-up since there were 2 known occasions in a matter of 1 week where metal fragments were found in the engine oil . The timeline looked like the #1 EMCD tripped and the corrective action was to defer the #1 EMCD. At some point shortly after metal fragments were recovered and sent in for analyses. Over the course of a few days recurring inspections of the #1 EMCD were conducted and signed-off on. Then on night of Day 0 additional metal fragments were found in the aft sump and the corrective action was to close out the #1 EMCD deferral and put in place a different inspection protocol that didn't have anyone look again for another 50-70 flight hours. This was not adding up since on multiple occasions metal fragments had been found. I again refused the aircraft as the safety of the aircraft was in doubt. As we concluded the conference call between myself, dispatch, and the Chief Pilot one of them told the other to just replace the crew as we ended the call. My observation of the events of this report is that the integrity of the schedule was the number one priority - to the complete exclusion of safety. As the pilot in command, my assessment of the aircraft maintenance history, MEL application, and discussions with maintenance technicians regarding the presence of metal shavings indicated by the chip detector was completely disregarded. I was unable to legally or ethically sign the dispatch release guaranteeing the safe operation of flight - and dispatch's answer was to find someone else who would. The fact that I was actually asked ""if you didn't know what you know about the engine history, would that change your decision"" is preposterous. In my XX years as an airline pilot, I have never refused an aircraft before. I do not take it lightly. The complete disregard for the checks and balances of safety is extraordinarily troubling.

While establishing a 10 mile final for runway XX at ZZZ with the first officer as PF and the Captain as PM, the flight deck suddenly got very warm (15-20 degrees F hotter) when no changes had been made to any of the zone temperature selectors. There was also no corresponding increase on the air temperature gauge. Within about 10 seconds of the temperature increase, both myself and the first officer started to smell a dirty, musty gym sock odor followed by a burning rubber smell with a hint of electrical burning. The fumes made me momentarily light headed with some moderate throat irritation.We both donned our oxygen masks and established crew communication. I notified ZZZ tower that we had fumes in the flight deck and that both pilots were now using the oxygen masks. The tower controller asked if we wanted to [request priority handling] and I said yes given the fact that we were both on oxygen and I didn't yet know how bad the fumes were in the cabin or if they were going to get worse. We had also gotten high on the approach while we were putting on our oxygen masks so I told ZZZ tower to break us off the approach and vector us back to a downwind and base for the visual to runway XX. The FO called for the Smoke, Fire, or Fumes checklist. I ran the QRC first. At step 4 of the QRC I contacted the number 1 FA (Flight Attendant) on the inter phone. I asked if she could smell anything and she reported that she smelled a strong burning tire smell in the forward galley that seemed to be coming from under the flight deck door. I advised her that we would be landing normally but that safety vehicles with their lights on would be present after landing. I also told her to call me if there was a significant change in cabin conditions or if anyone needed medical assistance.After speaking with the number 1 FA, I continued with the QRH for Smoke, Fire, or Fumes through step 12 while the FO handled the radio and flew the aircraft on a downwind to base and final. We reported runway XX in sight and were cleared for a visual approach. At that point I discontinued the QRH to focus on PM duties for the landing. After landing, I took control at 60 knots. Tower asked if we could exit the runway and since our condition seemed to be stable, we exited the runway at taxiway 1 and told tower that we would stop there for a moment to check to see if the fumes were gone and also to check on the cabin. In hindsight I should have just stopped on the runway to allow ARFF (airport rescue and firefighting) more access to the aircraft if we needed them. Lesson learned.We removed our oxygen masks and the fumes were no longer present. I called the number 1 FA and she said everything was fine in the cabin and that the fumes had dissipated. I then made a short PA to the passengers to tell them that we had an issue just prior to landing and that they would see safety vehicles with their lights on near the aircraft but that it was just a standard precaution. We then proceeded to the gate normally but with ARFF following us.Once at the gate, we deplaned normally with the exception that cabin lighting was unavailable due to QRH checklist items but there was enough light from open window shades that it wasn't too dark. The FA's did caution the passengers to take care due to dimmer than normal lighting conditions. In hindsight, I should have turned on the emergency exit lights to assist with cabin lighting for deplaning but I didn't think of it at the time. Another lesson learned.ARFF personnel came up to the flight deck and told me he would go check the E and E bay for any indication of fire or residual fumes. He returned and reported that everything seemed fine. I then entered the mechanical discrepancy into the logbook and contacted maintenance control. I also submitted the Smoke, Odor, and fumes worksheet and verified that maintenance control had received it. There were no reports of crew or passenger illness or injury from the event.My first officer andflight attendants all did an excellent job and I was very fortunate to have them as my crew. Also, ZZZ tower and ARFF were most helpful as well as the fantastic ZZZ operations team. Days like this are most challenging and stressful but having a great team backing me up as the Captain makes it go much smoother and better. A big thanks from me to all who helped!Cause: According to maintenance control, this was the third Smoke, Odor, and Fumes event since Day 0 on Aircraft X. After the second event, this aircraft should have been pulled from service until the cause of the fumes event was determined with 100% certainty and fixed accordingly.

Our inbound flight on Aircraft Y was delayed in ZZZ1 due to maintenance issues. At approximately XA:55, As passengers began deplaning in ZZZ, our crew proceeded down the jet bridge to prepare for a timely crew swap. As this was an OE flight and I was acting in the First Officer role, I went outside to perform the exterior inspection.Upon returning to the jet bridge, I overheard the inbound Captain describing that the lavatory had been over-serviced to the point that it overflowed into the aft cabin. Once the inbound crew fully deplaned, we boarded the aircraft and were immediately overwhelmed by a strong sewage odor.As I moved toward the rear of the aircraft to stow my roller bag, the stench intensified significantly. Several members of the crew, including myself, also noticed visible dampness in the aft 2-3 rows of cabin carpeting.I discussed the conditions with both the Flight Attendants and the Captain in training. We unanimously agreed that the aircraft was in an unsafe and unsuitable condition for boarding passengers or operating any flight. We began coordinating with Operations and Maintenance to find a solution.Ultimately, the decision was made to swap our crew onto an arriving aircraft from ZZZ2, while Aircraft X would be ferried to Maintenance for proper inspection and sanitation.The consensus from Operations, Maintenance, and the crew was that the aircraft should not have departed ZZZ1 in its prior state. Upon reviewing the inbound Captain's logbook entry, I noticed that his narrative to us mentioned significant overflow into the passenger compartment, yet the logbook entry did not accurately reflect that blue lavatory fluid had contaminated the cabin carpet. This omission was concerning, as the condition poses a potential corrosion risk and may exceeded acceptable cabin hygiene for passenger or crew operations.Furthermore, the Captain in training stated that he overheard several passengers on the inbound leg complaining about the odor. In my opinion, the inbound crew appeared to prioritize completing the flight over ensuring the aircraft was in a safe and sanitary condition.It's worth noting that after sitting open for several hours, the smell had somewhat dissipated and the carpet appeared dry, per the mechanic who later assessed the aircraft--though none of our crew touched it to verify.This situation resulted in significant delays, including a delay of over 7 hours for flight ABCD and the subsequent flight AEFG.Cause: The primary root cause appears to be the inbound Captain's failure to accurately convey the severity of the lavatory issue to the Maintenance Controller, or the Maintenance Controller's decision to defer the AFT lavatory without addressing the fact that blue lavatory fluid had overflowed into the passenger cabin. Additionally, the inbound crew's decision to operate the aircraft on a revenue flight to an outstation, despite clear signs that it was unfit for passenger service, represents a serious lapse in judgment. It suggests that reaching the layover may have been prioritized over ensuring safety and passenger comfort. The original issue--the lavatory overflow--was likely caused by improper servicing, possibly due to a lack of training, understanding, or attention to detail by the ground personnel who performed the task.Suggestion: Over the past year, I've observed several lavatory-related issues, particularly at outstations but also occasionally at hubs--most notably in ZZZ3. The most common problem involves ground crews failing to service the lavatory altogether. This often results in toilets flushing without blue juice, ultimately requiring the lav to be deferred until it can be properly purged by Maintenance. Deferrals are time-consuming and can significantly impact on-time performance. In certain circumstances--such as a single-lav CRJ700 operating a block time over 90 minutes--this can result in the aircraft being stuck at an outstation or requiring a ferry flight. There should be increased emphasis on ensuring lavatory servicing is completed on every turn. Stations that consistently fail to meet this basic requirement should face appropriate accountability or corrective actions. Additionally, the decision in this case to accept the aircraft for passenger flight out of ZZZ1 rather than take the time to address the issue properly is questionable. I believe this situation presents a clear training and counseling opportunity--primarily for the Captain--who should have been more specific in describing the extent and location of lavatory fluid exposure in the cabin.

I was the Captain of Flight ABCD from ORD to ZZZ on Day 0. After completing ZZZ1 - ORD, we were assigned a different aircraft to operate Flight ABCD. After closing the main cabin door my headset would not transmit or receive on the intercom or radio. After several minutes of troubleshooting, we had to open the door which meant a return to the gate. Following that return to the gate, we were assigned a new airplane, Aircraft X. Preflight and taxi proceeded as normal.While holding short of Runway 22L at ORD for departure, we were given a line up and wait clearance for 22L. Once we lined up on the runway and stopped, I handed my First Officer (FO) the controls and I took the radios. Following SOP, both crew members noticed the Captain's Primary Flight Display (PFD) and Multi-function Flight Display (MFD) displaying a red magnetic flag indicating loss of heading on AHRS 1 and loss of Captain's Flight Director (FD) with a red line through the takeoff mode on the Flight Mode Annunciator (FMA). My FO's flight instruments were normal. At the same time this was noticed, ATC gave us a takeoff clearance. After both crew members agreed to not take off, my FO informed ATC we were unable to depart and we needed to pull off the runway and contact Maintenance.Right after we pulled off the runway, Aircraft Y also cancelled their takeoff and pulled off the runway. My FO asked over the radio if they had lost their heading indication as well and they did. As directed by Maintenance, I wrote this event up in the log as a discrepancy for rejected takeoff (despite not beginning the takeoff roll at any point) due to the red magnetic flag on Captain's PFD and MFD. Both Aircraft Y and our flight returned to the gate. After landing check was accomplished and all SOP procedures were followed for returning to the gate and writing up the discrepancy.Upon returning to the gate, Maintenance performed an operations check of Aircraft X's AHRS system and it passed the operations check. The plane was signed off and we were good to attempt the flight again. Preflight and taxi to the runway proceeded normally and per SOP procedures. However, once we lined up on 22L at ORD for departure again following a line up and wait clearance, the same exact thing happened only seconds after lining up on 22L. The Captain's PFD and MFD both displayed the red magnetic flag, no FD, and a red line through the takeoff mode on the FMA. This time, my FO informed ATC we would not be able to take off before ATC issued a takeoff clearance. Returning to the gate again, the after landing check was accomplished and all SOP procedures were followed for returning to the gate and writing up the discrepancy.On the way back to the gate, Dispatch sent us an ACARS which we received once we already got to the gate asking us to try to depart on a different runway. There were two concerns I had with doing this. First, both the FO and I were now past our normal duty limit and flying into our 2-hour extension which we both accepted. While neither of us were fatigued, we would time out of our flight duty period at XB:45 and it was XA:15 at the time of taxiing back to the gate. I did not believe we would have enough time to complete the flight at this point without exceeding the time. The second concern I had is if we continued through with departing, we would have departed with a known discrepancy with AHRS 1. Per SOP procedures I felt the proper course of action per procedures and with the best interest of the safety of the flight was to log the discrepancy and return to the gate. After the second return to the gate, I briefed the passengers face-to-face from the Flight Attendant (FA) PA to advise them of what happened and why we returned to the gate twice for the same issue. The passengers appreciated it, and this seemed effective at reducing passenger frustration.Prior to this flight, I have never once experienced a complete loss of heading on either AHRS system when departing from Runway 22L at ORD. I am filing a report because I believe there is an issue with 22L significantly affecting flight instruments which can cause safety of flight issues. As of now, I have not found guidance that allows us to take off with a red magnetic flag and no FD on the PFD. If anything, taking off with no FD and a red magnetic flag violates SOP procedures.One thing I would have done differently is asked for a different runway for departure on the second taxi out in Aircraft X. Besides that, I believe my FO and I made the most conservative decisions for prioritizing safety and following our procedures.